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gpous un Prancais,suivra Za condition de son mqri."

Chap. 1,

Liv. 1, Art. 12. "1 ne femme _Francaise qui 4pousera un 6tranger, suivra la condition de son mar." Chap. 2, Sec. 1, Art. 19.
She may regain her quality of Frenchwoman when she becomes a
widow, if she resides in France, and declares that she will fix herr
self there. The statute of 7 & 8 Victoria, sec. 16, before cited,
says that "any wofaan who shall be married to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed to be herself naturalized,
and have all the rights and privileges of a natural-born subject."
The provision of this statute seems to be made in the best terms, if
any provision upon the subject is adopted.
The great object of such provisions should be, to give clearly and
unambiguously, the rights which it means to give; for no ambiguities are more pernicious than such as tend to disturb individuals and
families in regard eitherto succession to property, or to the exercise
of political franchises.
It is with the view of promoting the security of such interests,
that the writer submits the foregoing remarks for public conside-

ration.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Eastern District
of PennsyZvania. In Equity. October, 1853.
CALVIN E. STOWE AND HAMUET BEECHER STOWE HIS WIFE v. F. w.
THOMAS.
1. When an author has sold his book, the only property which he reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the copies
of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another
the ideas intended to be conveyed; and this, which the law terms an author's
" copy" or "copyright," embraces nothing more.
2. There is no difference, as respects the character or quality of the right, between
the right and property of an author at common law,-under the statute of 8
Anne, c. 19,-and under the acts of Congress respecting copyrights; and that
description of an infringement which would be applicable in the one case, is
applicable in the others.
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3. A "copy" of a book must be a transcript of the language in which the conceptions of the author are clothed, of something printed and embodied in a tangible
shape.
4. In questions of infringement of copyright, the inquiry is not, whether the defendant has used the thoughts, conceptions, information or discoveries promulgated
by the original, but whether his composition may be considered a new work,
requiring invention, learning and judgment, or only a mere transcript of the whole
or parts of the original, with merely colorable variations.
5. The case of Millar v. Taylor,-(4 Burr. 2303,) has finally settled the question as
to the nature of the property which an author has in his works; and the inference that a translation is not an infringement of copyright, is a logical result
and a necessary corollary, from the principles of law then decided.
6. The distinction taken by some, between works vhich are publici jurs, and those
which are subject to copyright, has no foundation in fact; if the established doctrine of the cases be true, and the author's property in a published book consists
only in a right of copy.
7. A translation can, in no correct sense, be called a "copy"

of a book.

The sole question in this case was, Whether a translation of a

copyrighted work is an infringement of the copyright?

It was

decided upon the final hearing of the cause, after argument upon

bill and answer.
question in

The facts material to an understanding of the

controversy, sufficiently appear in the arguments

of

counsel and in the opinion of the Court.

iS. (. -Perkins,for Complainants.
There have been no decisions upon the point, either in England
or the United States; and but recently in France. It has been
the subject of legislation in Prussia, Belgium and Russia; and been
much discussed by text-writers on the subject. It is an important
question, since now, owing to the extensive international changes

of population, translations of copyrighted works will pay in this
country; and the rights of authors are largely involved in the
inquiry, whether the fruits of their genius are to be a source of

profit to themselves alone, or must be shared with others.

The fact

that a translation of a copyrighted work would not be profitable,

has prevented the question from being practically tested heretofore;
and, therefore, the monient the reverse is the case, the question

assumes an important aspect as regards the literary world.
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I. Mrs. Stowe has a copyright at common law, as well as under
the statute, in the enjoyment of which she is entitled to be protected by this Court.
II.The "copyright" of an author is the same in charactpr or
quality, at common law and under the statutes of this and other
countries. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2311, 2346, 2396 ; -Donaldson v. Beckett, id. 2408 ; Federalist, No. 43; Story Comm.
Const. § 1152; Acts of Cong. May 81, 1790, and Feb. 3,1831;
Stat. 8 Ann. c. 19; Law of Belgium, cited 1 Renouard (Trait6
des Droits d'Auteurs) 247; General Law of Prussia, cited id. 269;
Law of Russia, cited id. 285; 1st Resolution of Germanic Confederation, Art: 1, cited id. 280; Law of France, July 19, 1793,
cited id. 327. There is no limitation or restriction of the right,
except as to its duration, and the conditions precedent required to
secure the protection of the statutes.
•III. The translation of Mrs. Stowe's work published by the
defendant, is an infringement of her copyright.
1st. On principle. The nature and quality of the right-the
thing itself contended for,-does not depend on any metaphysical
distinctions, or discussions as to whether it shall be called a privilege or property. It may be called property; the designation is
a convenient one, but it is not to embarrass or restrict the right.
An author is the "creator," the "e fi cient cause" of a thing.
See the argument of M. Merlin in Letourmyj v. Huet-Perdoux, 3
Rep. de Jurisp. 701, tit. Contrefacon § 11.
An author of a book, as such, has the right: First. Of excluding
every other person from any participation in the enjoyment, use, or
even the mere knowledge of the existence of his work, or the result.
of his labors; and of undisturbed and uninterrupted enjoyment of
this right. Second. Of absolute disposal of all his right,-title and
interest in his book, in any way not injurious or detrimental to the
public; and his assignee stands on precisely the same footing.
Third. Of disposing of any part or portion of his work, or result of
his labor, or of any right or interest therein, or of any part of a
right or interest therein, in any way not injurious or detrimental to
the public; and, so far as disposed of, his assignee is wholly substi-
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tuted to the rights of the author; but as regards the part or portion
undisposed of, the author's rights remain undiminished and unaltered, and he is to be protected therein.
The fallibility of all human legislation, and the impossibility of
securing by its means the full enjoyment of any right, have given
rise to the restrictions as to time, and the conditions precedent in
the various statutes on the subject, requisite to entitle an author to
the protection afforded thereby; which do not at all, however, affect
these propositions.
In ordinary cases of publication, the author either waives the
first of these rights, or exercises the second, or himself or his
assignee exercises the third; and in the latter case, the author or
his assignee disposes of the free mental use of his intellectual productions to each purchaser of a copy of his book; and of the right of
the free communication thereof to others in the ordinary intercourse and social relations of life, and of the absolute control and
disposal of the material copy or copies purchased. But no such
purchaser thereby acquires any right to a beneficial enjoyment of,
and pecuniary profit from the intellectual labor of the author.
A translation is an infringement of these rights. To translate is
"to render into another language," (Webster.) The .translator
aims to convey to the mind of the reader of his translation, the
very ideas and thoughts of the author, in his very manner and form,
words (correspondingly,) style and manner of expression-the
identical creation and mental production. All changes, all" variations in any and each one of these particulars are failures, (perhaps
unavoidable, but no less failures,) and are carefully and studiously
guarded against as far as possible.
a. A translation calls for no creation on the part of the translator. Any one who understands two languages can translate from
one into the other. The translation is the same book.' A German
translation is no more a new book because an American cannot
understand it while a German can, than a book printed in raised
letters for the use of the blind thereby becomes a new book. See
the expressions of Lord IBacon, respecting his "1De Augmentis," in
his presentation letter to King James, cited N. Am. Rev. vol. 55,
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(1842) p. 255, note. The elegance of the translation, the skill of
the translator can make no difference. Whether the translation is
clumsy or the contrary, it is the original author, and not the translator, who is the efficient cause of the work. The author .cannot use the labor of a translator without compensation, any more
than he can that of a printer; and the converse is as true, that the
translator can no more than the printer, use the labor of an author
as a source of profit without his consent. A translation is quasi
mechanical. A printer often exercises his mental powers in a high
degree in deciphering the manuscript, correcting errors, and properly punctuating.
b. The translator is wholly dependent for the existence of his
translation on that which is exclusively a matter of private right,
and not on something publici juris. It, is a mixture of his labor
with that which belongs to another, as it were a chemical mixture;
and he can claim no advantage from his own wrong doing. Analogy
from the Law of Bailments. 2 Black. Comm. 405; Story on Bailm.
§ 40; 2 Story Eq. Jur. § 942; Webb v. Powers,2 Woodb. & Min.
514, 521. The caaes on the subject of annotations are cases of a
mechanical mixture. Tonson v. Walker, 8 Swans. 672. See also
Camypbell v. Scott, 11 Si'm. 81; Carnan v. Bowles, 2 Br. C. C. 80;
Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6; Hawman v. Tegg, 2"Russ. 390.
c. If a translation is held not to be an infringementj the doctrine
must be carried out to all its legitimate and necessary results. A
work may be published in any characters different from thoseused
by the original author, and adapted to another class of readers,
without any violation of his rights. It may .be published phonographically or phonetically. It may convey the very identical ideas.
and words and style of the author to the mind of the reader,, yet
he would be entitled to no protection under the position' contended
for by the defendant. Unless a translation is an infringement, both
the original work and the translation must be regarded with respect
to further translation as pvublici juris; and the translation may
consequently be retranslated into. the original, and if done bonafide
there would be no redress, however great the injury. The popularity and demand for the work which made it profitable to publish
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a translation, would justify the expense of first translating and then
retranslating the original, by any one wishing to derive a profit
from the author's labor without compensation to him. The author
would find- no protection by publishing simultaneously in two or
more languages. He would only thereby afford facilities to any
one desirous of interfering with his profits. If defendant's view is
correct, a manuscript, if surreptitiously obtained, could be translated
and retranslated with impunity, and thus the publication of the
work by the original author be entirely defeated. The return of
the manuscript would be no redress. The case is not an improbable
supposition. Manuscripts have been threatened to be published by
those who had no right to publish them. -Duke of Queensbury v.
Sihebbeare, 2 Eden R. 829; Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Meriv. 435.
Under the view, contended for by the defendant, the protection of
the statute respecting the publication of manuscripts without the
consent of the author, would be of little practical value. Act of
Cong. Feb. 8, 1831, § 9.
d. If a translation be not an infringement, it must itself be entitled
to protection, as possessing the quality of originality, -which is the
very foundation of the claim to protection. A translation qud
translation is entitled to protection, i. e. no one has a right to use
the translator's labor without his consent. So the original author
cannot publish annotations by another without his consent; but
neither annotator nor translator has any right to take that which
is the original author's against his will. A published work not
copyrighted is publicijurs, and no one's rights are trespassed upon
in allowing and protecting its translation. See Wyatt v. Barnard,
3 Yes. & Bea. 77. No conception, no idea, no word, and no form of
expression is the translator's. All are the original author's, and
so regarded by the reader.
2d. Upon authority. The general principle which has governed
the Courts in their decision of copyright cases lies in the question,
"Whether the work or parts of a work complained of as being an
infringement, could ever have existed had not the original existed,
without a coincidence iii the mental conceptions and modes of expression of the original author and the alleged infringer, so striking
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as to be beyond all probability ?" Or, "Whether the alleged
infringer has used the literary property of another, not as a centre
about which to group his own thoughts and ideas in his own style,
but as that out of which itseW, from its peculiar and intrinsic value,
he has undertaken by publication to make profit for himself?" Or,
to advance a step upon the last form of question: "Has the
original author suffered, or will he suffer injury, from the act complained of?" Curtis on Copyright, 240.
The authorities will be considered in classes chronologically.
First. Where the whole or any part of a work has been reprinted
verbatim. Tonson v. Walker, (1752); Carnanv. Bowles, (1786);
Cary v. K~earsley, (1802,) 4 Esp. 168. Upon the inquiry as to
the animus suggested in this last case, see Folsom v. Marsh, (1841,)
2 Story R. 117, and .Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807,) 1 Campb. 94;
and as to the test proposed in this last case, of the work complained
of being a i,substitute" for the original, see Bohn v. Bogue, (1847,)
10 Lond. Jurist, 421. Longman v. Winchester, (1809,) 16 Yes.
269;. Wilkins v. Aiken, (1810,) 17 Yes. 422; Whittingham v.
Wooler, (1817,)-2 Swans. 428; Mawman v. Tegg, (1826); Saunders v. Smith, (1838,) 3 Myl. & Cr. 711; Lewis v. Fularton,
(1839); Campbell v. Scott, (1842); Bogue v. ifoulston, (1852,) 10
Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 215, S.C. 16 Lond. Jur. 372. The quantity
taken in cases of this kind is no criterion. Sweet v. Shgw, 1 Lond.
Jar. 917; Bramhall v. Hfolcombe, 3 Myl. & Cr. 737.
Second. Where the alleged infringement is in the form of colorable additions, alterations, or improvements, assuming the appearance of a new work. Stationers' Co. v. Seymour, (1668,) 1 Mod.
256; Tonson v. Walker, (1752); Matthewson v. Stocekdale, (1806,).
12 Yes. 270; Roworth v. WTlkes, (1807); longman v. Winchester, (1809); Wilkins v. -Aiken, (1810); West v. Francis,(1822,)
5 B. & Ald. 737; Barfield v. Nicholson, (1824,) 2 Sim. & Stu. 1;
Gray v. IBussell, (1839,) 1 Story R. 11; E merson v. Davies,
(1845,) 3 id. 768 ; Webb v. Powers, (1847.)
Third. Abridgments. Story's BExors. v. Holcombe, (4 MffLean,
306,) is apparently a direct authority that an abridgment is no infringement. But this point was not necessary to the decree of the
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Court; and if it were, it is decided exclusively on authority; and
that authority, Gy-es v. Wilicox, (1740,) 2 Atk. 141; Anon.
(1775,) Lofft, 775; Dodsley v. Xinnersley, (1785,) Ambl. 403;
and TYoom, v. Marsh, (1841,) cases at best but apparently decisive. The other cases upon abridgments, are Butterworthv. Robinson, (1801,) 5 Ves. 709; Gray v. Russell,.(1839); and _Emerson v.
Davies, (1845). See also Ld. Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors,
vol. 5, p. 72, (Amer. edit.) It is questionable whether the abridgments referred to so loosely in some of these cases, do not mean
abridgments such as those of Viner" and Bacon. The original
author has a copyright in the plan of his work. Story's Exors. v.
Holcombe; .Emerson v. Davies. See also Merlin, Questions de
Droit, tom. 6, p. 485, tit. Propri&t6Litteraire, § 1.
Fourth. Musical Compositions ;-Are "books" under stat. 8
Ann. c. 19, and are specifically included in our own statutes. Bach
v. Longman, (1777,) Cowp. 623; Olementi v. Golding, (1809,) 2
Campb. 25, and cases cited p. 27 n.; D'Almaine v. Boosey, (1835,)
1 Y. & C. Exch. 296 ; Reed v. Carusi, (1845,) 8 Law Rep. 410;
Jollie v. Jaques, (1850,) Blatchf. 618.
Fifth. But the very point now in controversy, has been decided
in France, as appears by a note of M. Jules Delalain uppn the law
of July 19, 1793. "On trouve dans la jurisprudenceplusieurs
"1decisions en ce sens. Un arr~t de la cour de Rouen (7 Novem"bre 1845), deux arrtts de la cour de Paris(17 juillet 1847 et
"26 janvier 1852), reconnaissent aux auteurs seuls ou 4 leur
"ayants cause le droit de publier ou d'autoriser la traduetion de
"leurs oeuvres dans une Zangue dtrangere;" Lfgislation de la Propri~t6 Litttraire, 3 tme. edit. Paris, 1852, p. 5, n. 2.
Sixth. Opinions and weight of text writers. Godson on Patents,
344, 347; Kant, cited 1 Renouard, 261; and Renouard, tom. 2,
p. 36; hold that a translation is not an infringement. Pardessus,
Droit Commercial, pt. 2, tit. 1, Nos. 164, 167 ; Etienne Blanc,
Trait6 de la Contrefagon, 416; and Curtis, 290; hold the contrary.
A translation could n~t possibly exist without the prior existence
of the original. The translator uses the literary property of

218

C. E. STOWE AND H. B. STOWE v. F. W. THOMAS.

another as that out of which itself, from its individual and intrinsic value, he expects by publication to make profit. The author is
injured in the sale of his work by a translation, as the very large
class who but imperfectly understand the language in which the
original is written, will prefer to read the translation, and save themselves the labor and difficulty they would have otherwise taken to
read the work in the original tongue.
No special legislative- provisions exist on this point in this country, England or France. Prussia, in her General Code of 1791,
§§ 1027, 1028, (1 Renouard, 267,) and the general law of 1837,
§ 4, (id. 268) ; Russia, in the Digest of 1835, tit. 2, (id. 288) ; Belgium, by the laws of 1814, Art. 12, (id. 248,) and of 1817, Art. 2,
(id. 249); have all made express provision on this point.
@oepp contr&-.-The question assumes a special importance in
view of the peculiar character of the German emigration to this
country. Many of those who compose it, though in reduced circumstances, are educated. They expect to become citizens. It is
the policy of the law to encourage among them an acquaintance
with the circumstances of the country, and a familiarity with its
literature.
I. The fair result of all authorities supports the defendant's position, that a translation is no infringement of copyright:
1st. There is no direct authority that a translation is. an infringement. The burden of the argument lies on the complainants. The
statute is a restraining one, and must be construed strictly. A
translation is not forbidden by express words; and in the common
understanding it is not a 11copy."
Burnett v. C9etwood, (8 Meriv. 441. n.) contains a dictum in
defendant's favor. Curtis, (187, 289,) argues against our p 6sitilon.
He argues, however, in the very teeth of authority. He exhibits
a desire to make the law,-not to give a history of it. He is protection mad. Curtis, Cap. V. & IX.
Pardessus is against us. Renouard supports the defendant's
position, and is entitled to more weight than Pardessus, as being
a writer upon this special subject, and therefore more likely to
have thoroughly investigated it. British International Copyright
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Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 59, Curtis, App. p. 57 ; Laws of Prussia and
Russia, Curtis, pp. 289, 290, n.
2d. The decisions do not establish by inference or fair analogy
that a translation is an infringement. The result of all the cases
in -which injunctions have been granted, is that there must be :A. Damage to the original from the alleged piracy. Folsom v.
Marsh; Campbell v. Scott; Bramhall v. .folcombe; Saunders
v. Smith ; Roworth v. Wilkes. Complainants must show that the
sale of the translation has injured, and will injure the profits of the
work in English. In fact it does the contrary, it advertises the
work-draws attention to it. Complainant has herself published a
German tianslation of Uncle Tom's Cabin. The copyright of defendant in his translation estops the complainants from denying his
right. This Bill is in fact, though not in name, brought for the
protection of Complainant's own German translation, and not of the
original.
B. Sufficient originality in the original work to entitle it to protection. Lewis v. _ullarton; Gary v. Longman, (1 East, 358);
Longman v. Winch ester; lMatthewson v. Stockdale; Wilkins v.
Aiken; Baily v. Taylor, (3 Law Journ. 66); Cray v. Russell;
Emerson v. .Davies.
C. As to the form of appropriation by the alleged infringer.
(a.) The law is clear respecting verbatim copies. Lewis v. .ullarton; Sweet v. Sh'aw; Saunders v. Smith; *TV7eaton v. Peters,
(8 Pet. 591); Campbell v. Scott; Bell v. Walker, (1 Bro. C. C.
451); Butterworth v. Robinson; Roworth v. Wilkes. (b.) An
appropriation of the ]lan, where the plan constitutes the substantive merit of the original, and nothing of substantive merit is added.
Emerson v. Davies. See also Curtis, p. 286, and n. (c.) A colorable alteration. Swcet v. Slaw; Bell v. Walker; Butterworth v.
Robinson; Emerson v. Davies; 2 Story Eq. Jurisp. 9 939.
(d.) The only class of cases which it can be pretended includes
this case, is il-at which in respect to the manner of appropriation by
the infringcr, establishes the principle that servile and mechanical
imitations aye infringements. Emerson v. Davies; D'A~zaine
v. Boosey; Joilie y. Tayues. This is the test of piracy.
.Sayre
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v. Moore, 1 East 861 n. 6.

But a translation requires genius in

its construction. Is a translation a work of such a nature, that if
a translator were ordered to make one, he must, of absolute necessity, make one similar in substance to that of defendant ? The
position of Complainants that a translation is mechanical, is denied.
It gives scope for literary criticism. The translator impresses the
work with his individual characteristics. A daguerreotype is a
servile copy; a miniature an original work. *A translation may be
a mere servile copy, as in the case of recipes, chemical and algebraic
formulas, almanacs, nautical tables, &c. In these cases a mere use
of the dictionary is all that is necessary, and the comparison between the labor of a translator and printer holds good. But where
the genius of the translator is called forth, there he is himself an
author, and his translation an original work. The labor of a mechanic involves a denial of his individuality. The translator preserves
his individuality. It gives the very character to the work. The
labor of the printer is not a subject for criticism; that of the translator is. We bring anywork home to the individuality of any person by criticism. It can be done with respect to a trahslator, but
not to a printer.
As to the meaning of the words "plagiarism," "translation"
and " copy," see Webster's and Richardson's Dictionaries. The
expression 11auteurs d'ecrits en tout genre" in the law of France,

(July 19, 1793,) which is equivalent to the word "author" in the
Acts of Congress, is well explained by M. Merlin, (Curtis, 169, n.1.)
If a translation is a work of genius, then the translator employed
by the defendant is an author, and not a copyist.
3d. The tendency of authority is in support of the doctrine that.
a translation is not an infringement. See Burnett v. Uhetwood;
British International Copyright Act, Curtis, App. 57; .the lMws
of Prussia and Russia, Curtis, 289 n. 1, 290 n. 1. In France,
Renouard supports the defendant's position.
Translations as to protection of copyright are undistinguishable from other works. Wryatt v. Barnard; Drewry on Injunctions,
213; -Emersonv. Davies, dictum of Story J. To exclude a translation from the general rule, that a work involving genius in its con-

C. E. STOWE AND H. B. STOWE v. F. W. THOMAS.

struction is original, and as such entitled to the benefit of the Copyright Acts, a distinction is. made between a translation of a copyrighted work, and one not copyrighted. To carry out this distinction it must be shown that reprints of works not publici j"ris, are
entitled to copyright. The argument of Complainants is an
attempt to make a translator a hybrid between a thief and a thinker.
The adoption of the work of another is not malum prohibitum.
Literal transcriptions are -llowed where they do not injure the sale
of the original, and where they are fairly made. .Dodsleyv. Kinnersly. Reviews increase the sale of a work. Bell v. Whitehead,
17 Law Jour. 142, cited Curtis 245, 6. The whole of a work
may be copied, and printed with notes. Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim.
298 ; Cary v. Kearsley.
As to the case of abridgments, the question lies in the word
"fair"; and fair abridgments are allowable. Anon. (Lofft. 775);
Oyles v. Willcox; Beacd v. .odges, cited 3 Swanst. 679; D'Almaine v. Boosey/; Story's Exors. v. .Holcombe. The whole must be
preserved in its sense, just as in a translation; and a translation
may be a fair one. The very exactness of a translation is a proof
of its originality. It requires mental and intellectual labor. It is
a work of the mind,-not mechanical merely.
Upon the point of imitation and mere resemblance; Sayre v.
Moore. Take by way of illustration the case of prints engraved
from a painting. Translations and engravings are analogous, with
respect to their relations to the originals. See Godson 344; -Emerson v. Davies; Curtis, 170. The authorities most hostile to us,the most rabid text-writers, carry the question no further than the
point of damage.
We are sustained by the authorities, unless the complainants
establish the existence of a distinction between original works not
infringements, and those which are. A distinction for which there
is not a shadow of authority, and Which is contrary to sound reason.
The defendant's argument from authority, then, resolves itself
into three syllogisms. First. No original work can be an infringement of any other. Bht a translation is an original work, and
therefore cannot be an infringement of any copyright. Second.
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The appropriation by one author of the work of another is not an
infringement of copyright, unless it injures the sale of the original,
or is colorable merely, or is servile and the work of a mere copyist.
A spirited translation increases the sale of the original by enhancing its reputation; is made openly, bona fide; is not servile,
and cannot be accomplished by a mere mechanic in literature.
Third. A work is original though it absorb the productions of
other authors, if it modifies them by the author's own genius or
reflection. A spirited translation of .a work belonging to the artistic department of literature, modifies the original production by
the reflection and genius of the translator.
The common Jaw authorities are not binding; they are only to
be regarded in proportion to their intrinsic value. The history of
the origin of the common law right of authors is found in Curtis,
pp. 27-29, 30, 31, 36. The Act of Anne owes its origin to Dutch
influence, aid customs respecting monopolies which came in with
William 3d. The act was passed in the same year with an act to
protect wigmakers by prohibiting men from wearing their own hair.
The Commons were disposed to over-legislation. . The dase of Mular v. Tayflor is doubtful upon the common law right. The'decisions since that Act have tended to' narrow down ihe restrictions
imposed. Act of 54 George 3. c. 156, July 29, 1814, Curtis, App.
p. 42. As to the interests which lay at the foundation. of this Act,
see Mudie on the Copyright Question, London, 1838; Observations
on the Law of Copyright, p. 31, London, 1838. The statute of July
1, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, (Curtis, App. p. 64,) known as Sergeant
Talfourd's Act, is an index of the state of feeling among the readers of literature in England; and the same is the feeling in this
country. It is a branch of the same spirit which adopts the Gothic
style of architecture, and recurs to ancient times for models' of
action. It is natural in Europe, but not in this country, and is not
to be favored by American Courts.
The defendant is amenable to the common law of Pennsylvania
only. Complainant's copyright as respects the common law, is a
copyright in a foreign country. But the Constitution of the Uni-
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ted States abolished the common law right; and placed the matter
exclusively within the jurisdiction of Congress.
The Acts of Congress respecting copyright are to be construed
strictly. The presumption is, that Congress must have known of
the decisions under the common law, and would have excluded expressly from the protection of these statutes, any particular kind of
translation, (as those of copyrighted works,) had they so intended.
II. In point of principle, translations are original works, and not
copies. Curtis, 287. The foundation of the right prior to the
statute of Anne, was in theory, the naked right of property founded
on occupation. But it is not property. This has led to all the confusion on this subject. Property may, in a loose sense, be said to
be founded on labor. There is no labor in the production of literary works; it is pure enjoyment. It is not labor and property
which is meant to be protected by copyright. Tom Thumb's littleness is property just as milch as the product of an author's brain
is property.
So with the voice "of a singer. These are natural
gifts-physical; the source of an author's income is his genius
which is a natural mental gift,-his genius, which is a quality of the
mind; talent is the quantity of mind. All minds have genius;
the only difference is that some geniuses pay for their .exhibition,
others do not. It is genius which is intended to be protected and
encouraged.
The doctrine of mixture does not apply; it is a ruse thrown
out by Complainants. The concession that the defendant has
mixed his labor with that of Mrs. Stowe, is repudiated. If he
has taken anything, he has taken everything. There cannot be a
separation, any more than the marble of a statue can be separated
from the idea embodied in it. It is the very boast of the defendant, that he has taken everything, and has not contributed any labor
of his own; his translation is the very book, the whole book, and
nothing but the book. The question is not how much has Defendant taken, but in what manner. He has galvanized Mrs. Stowe's
copper statue with silver. The translator purchased Mrs. Stowe's
work and read it, imbuid his mind with the substance of it, and
rendered it into German. The substance of a work need not enter
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into the mind of a mere copyist at all. The Act of Congress only protects the body of Mrs. Stowe's work. Had the translator translated
the work without reading it, then it would have been a mere mechanical labor. A book is a mere communication-a fusion of minds.
The property is simply in the book itsey bodily; not in the communication. The translator's work is that of organic reproduction.
Tytler's Essay on the Principles of Translation, pp. 9, 20, 225, n.
D'Ablancourt's translation of Tacitus. The author's genius is not
sufficient to realize all the profits of her work by translating it.
The necessary results of Complainants' doctrine show its falsity.
Suppose Mrs. Stowe's book contained a suggestion which would settle
finally the great question of slavery, is it pretended that she would be
entitled to all the profits made in carrying out that suggestion ?
On grounds of public interest. The German population claim a
right to read "Uncle Tom's Cabin"; and Complainants have no
right to debar them.
B. 1. Brewster, same side. All that Complainants ask by the
bill is protection in their statute right,-not in any natural right,
or any common law right. Mrs. Stowe claims. a pri*iiege under
the statute. The Act of Congress of February 3, 1831, is a statute
against common right. It must be construed fairly and liberally,
not meanly. The protection afforded by the statute is to ".sul
book or books," Any discussion outside of the statute is foreign to
the subject. Coriiplainants assert that a translation of their book is
embraced within the terms of the statute. Illustrations drawn
from physical objects have no applicability in a case like this.
To support Complainants' view of the case, they must establish
the position that translation is a merely mechanical act. All the
cases recognize the principle, that where a person employs his
own genius and labor, even though he use the materials of.another,
he is entitled to protection. A translation is much more than a
mere mechanical transcription-a mere copying. Voss's Homer,
Urquhart's Rabelais, Coleridge's translation of Schiller's Wallenstein, Townley's Hudibras, Carlyle's translation of Goethe's Wilhelmeister, Bowditch's translation of La Place's Mecanique Celeste,
are all instances.of translations, requiring genius for their execution.

C. B. STOWE AND H. B. STOWE v. F. 1. THOMAS.

It is settled law that abridgments, improvements, &c., are to be
protected. Otis' Botany is little more than an abridgment of all
former works on the same subject; there is little that is really
original. Tytler on translation, pp. 9, 10.
The object of copyright is not merely to protect authors; if it
were, Mrs. Stowe is endeavoring to preyent the enjoyment of
our labor, in which we are protected by the statute. If she succeeds it will enable her to impose a bad translation, which it seems
she has published since the filing of the bill, upon the community.
The object of the statute is not merely to secure profits to authors;
but for the encouragement of letters, by affording protection to
right. The analogy between patent right and copyright is not a
just one. The inventor or designer is injured wherever or however
his invention or design is produced. Not so with an author, in
respect to his book.
Had defendant taken Uncle Tom's Cabin and published it with
a mere change of pages and chapters, then the analogy with the
transposition of a musical composition from a march to a dance
would hold good; but there can be no analogy in the present case.
It is no infringement of the copyright to publish variations upon
the musical composition of an original author; and the case of
translation is analagous.
The result of Complainants' position would be a monopoly of every
use of a book, except the simple reading it. Words are thingsMrs. Stowes power and the results of her work, are the results of
her wonderful power in the use of the English language. If she
were to publish in English and German at the same time, we could
translate either one into the other, or any indifferent language.
If there is a case on record which touches the present, it is
Burnett v. Cketwood, and that, as far as it goes, is in favor of
defendant.
S. ff. Perkins, in reply. It has hitherto been supposed, that
Congress meant by the copyright laws, to secure to the author the
profit from his work, throughout the length and breadth of this
country. The argument of defendant would give to the foreigrr
population a privilege denied to our native citizens.
15
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The protection conferred' by Congress is to the author, as an
author. An author of a book is the creator of the ideas-the
thought-the plan-the arrangement-the figures-the illustrations
-the argument-the style of expression. The exclusive right to
print, publish and sell these, is what is secured by copyright.
Defendant admits he has taken every one of these-that he has
taken every thing, even down to the punctuation marks.
There is in fact, little in the world which is absolutely original;
the oiiginality which is protected, must be. understood not in an
absolute sense, but, ccording to the ordinary views of men.
The whole.force of defendant's argument is to show that a translation is a work "f genius. But the greater the skill, the greater
the wrong.
The illustration derived from musical variations does not apply.
An individual may take one of the elements from an author's work
without breach of copyright; but not everything which in connection
with that work distinguishes the author from other men.
Value is not a test of infringement; nor the amount of injury;
nor the quantity taken. - An infringer may take the single grain of
wheat out of a bushel of chaff. - It is begging thequestion to say
that we have secured. the copyright in English, and in English
alone.
Act of Congress, 1831, c. 252, § 13,Manuscripts. Can a manuscript be lawfully published in German, which it would be unlawful to print in English?
The test is, as to the object of the original and of the alleged
infringement. Can any one by printing or painting in different
colors, a design invented or produced by another, escape thepenalty of Act of Chgress, August 29, 1842, c. 318, § 8 ; 'Pnd
enjoy its protection for the mere change of colors ? Can a line
engraving protected by copyright, be mezzotinted or lithographed
with impunity?
The common law authorities are to be invoked in regard to the
construction of the right at common law. The statute is not a
restraining one.
Can an algebraic work be translated without fear of infringing
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the copyright, merely by the employment of different characters to
represent the algebraic formulas ? There are certain fountains
open to all; if all draw alike there is no injury; but no one has a
right in order to save himself trouble and labor, to resort to what
has already been drawn and appropriated by another. Take for
example the Reports of the Presbyterian Church Case. Miller v.
cellroy, 1 Am. Law Reg. 198, Feb. 1853. The present case is
somewhat analagous to the engrafting of improvements upon a
patented article.
See the case of Lumley v. Bayard & al., (1 Am. Law Reg. 499,
June 1853,) in which the Cour de Cassation decided, that "The
translation into a foreign language of a French work, in France, is
a breach of the copyright."
GnRun, J. The bill in this case alleges that Mrs. Stowe is the
author and proprietor of a work called "1Uncle Tom's Cabin," and
has obtained a copyright for the same in due form of law; that the
defendant has translated into German, printed, published and sold
the same in newspaper and pamphlet form; that such translation is
an infringement of complainants' copyright; and therefore prays an
injunction, account, &c.
The answer admits the facts stated in the bill, but denies that
such translating, printing, publishing, &c., is an infringement of
complainants' copyright.
The question raised by these pleadings has not been decided
either in England or this country, in a case where it is directly
involved.
In many of the States of Europe, it has been made the subject of
special legislation. In France, jurists appear to be divided in opinion. Pardessus is of opinion, that a translation is an infringement
of copyright. Renouard, on the contrary, argues that it is not.
Mr. Godson, in his work on Patents, concurs with Renouard. Mr.
Curtis, in his treatise on Copyright, agrees with Pardessus.
In this balance of opinions among learned jurists, we must endeavor to find some ascertained principles of the common law as
established by judicial decision on which to found our conclusion.

C. E. STOWE AND H. B. STOWE v. F. W. THOMAS.

In order to decide what is an infringefnent of an author's rights,
we must inquire what constitutes literary property, and what is
recognised as such by the act of Congress, and secured and protected thereby.
An author may be said to be the creator or inventor, both of the
ideas contained in his book, and the combination of words to represent them. Before publication he has the exclusive possession of
his invention. His dominion is perfect. But when he has published
his book and given his thoughts, sentiments, knowledge or discoveries to the world, he can have no longer an exclusive possession of them. Such an appropriation becomes impossible, and is inconsistent with the object of publication. The author's conceptions
have become the common property of his readers, who cannot be
deprived of the use of them, or their right to communicate.hem to
others clothed in their own language, by lecture or by treatise.
The claini of literary property, therefore, after publication, cannot be in the ideas, sentiments, or the creations of the imagination
of the poet or novelist, as dissevered from the language, idiom, style,
or the outward semblance and exhibition of them. His exclusive
property in the creation of his mind, cannot be vested in the author
as abstractions, but only in the concrete form which he has given
them, and the language in which he has clothed theif. .When he
has sold his book, the only property which he reserves to himself,
or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the
copies -of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to
the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed. This is
what the law terms copy, or copyright. See Curtis on Copyright,
9, 10, 11, &c.
The statute of 8 Anine. c. 19, (which so far as it describes the
rights and property of an author is but declaratory of .the comihon
law,) is entitled, "An act for tile encouragement of learning, by
vesting the copies of printed books in'the authors, &c." It gives the
author "the sole right of printing and- reprinting such book or
books;" and describes those who infringe the author's rights, as persons "printing, reprinting or importing such book or books" with-
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out the license of the author. Our acts of Congress give substantially the same description both of the author's rights and what is an
infringement of them.
Now, although the legal definition of a "hook" may be much
more extensive than that given by lexicographers, and may include
a sheet of music as well as a bound volume; yet it necessarily conveys the idea of thought or conceptions clothed in language or in
musical characters, written, printed or published. Its identity does
not consist merely in the ideas, knowledge or information communicated, but in the same conceptions clothed in the same words,
which make it the same composition. (See 2 Black. Comm. 405.) A
"col)y" of a book must, therefore, be a transcript of the language
in which the conceptions of the author are clothed ; of something
printed and embodied in a tangible shape. The same conceptions
clothed in another language cannot constitute the same composition; not can it be called a transcript or "copy" of the same
"book."
I have seen a literal translation of Burns' poems into French
prose ; but to call it a copy of the original, would be as ridiculous
as the translation itself.
The notion that a translation is a piracy of the originkI composition is founded on the analogy assumed between copyright and
patents for inventions, and where the infringing machine is only a
change of the form or proportions of the original, while it embodies
the principle or essence of the invention. But as the author's
exclusive property in a literary composition, or his copyright, consists only in a right to multiply copies of his book, and enjoy the
profits therefrom, and not in an exclusive right to his conceptions
and inventions, which may be termed the essence of his composition,
the argument from the supposed analogy is fallacious.
Hence, in questions of infringement of copyright, the inquiry is
not, whether the defendant has used the thoughts, conceptions,
information or discoveries promulgated by the original, but whether
his composition may be considered a new work requiring invention,
learning and judgment, or only a mere transcript of the whole or
parts of the original, with merely colorable variations. -Hence
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also, the many cases to be found in the reports, which decide that
a bona fide abridgment of a book is not an infringement of copy-right.
To make a good translation of a work, often requires more learning, talent and judgment than was required to write the original.
Many can transfer from one language to another, but few can
translate. To call the translation of an author's ideas and conceptions into another language, a copy of his book, would be an abuse,
of terms, and arbitrary judicial legislation.
Although the question, now under consideration, was not directly
in issue in the great case of Mi/llar v. Taylor, yet the inference
that a translation is not an infringement of copyright, is a logical
result, and stated by the judges themselves as a necessary corollary,
from the principle of law then decided by the Court.
That case exhausted the argument, and has finally settled the
question as -to the nature of the property which an author has in
his works; and it is, that after publication, his property consists in
the "right of copy," which signifies "the sole right of printing,
publishing and selling'his literary composition or book;" not that
he has such a property in his original concepti 6 ns, that he - alone
can use them in the composition of a -new work, or clothe them
in a different dress by translation. He' may be. incompetent
to such a task, or to make a new work out of his old materials; and
neither the common law nor the statute give hjm such-a monopoly,
even of his own creations.
An author, says Lord Mansfield, has the same property in his
book, which the King has to the English translation of the Bible.
"Yet if any man should turn the Psalms, or the writings of Solomon, or Job, into verse, the King could not stop the printng or
sale of such a work. -t is the author's work; the King has, no
power or control over the subject matter. His power retfs in property. His whole right rests upon the foundation of propert%in
his coPY."
Mr. Justice Willes, in answer to the question, "Wherein consists
the identity of a book ?" says: " Certainly, bona fide imitations,
translationsand abridgments are different, and in respect of property may be considered new works."
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And Mr. Justice Aston observes: "The publication of a composition does not give away the property in the work. But the
right of copy still remains in the author. No more passes to the
public from the free will and consent of the author, than unlimited
use of every advantage that the purchaser can reap from the doctrine and sentiments which the work containd. He may improve it,
imitate it, translate it, oppose its sentiments; but he buys no right
to Tublish the identical work."
The distinction taken by some writers on the subject of literary
property, between the works which are publici juris, and those
which are subject to copyright, has no foundation, in fact; if the
established doctrine of the cases be true, and the author's property
in a published book consists only in a right of copy. By .the publication of her book the creations of the genius and imagination of
the author have become as much public property as those of Homer
or Cervantes. Uncle Tom and Topsy are as much publicijuris,as
Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. All her conceptions and inventions
may be used and abused -by imitators, playrights and poetasters.
They are no longer her own-those who have purchased her book,
may clothe them in English doggerel, in German or Chinese prose.
Her absolute dominion and property in the creations of her genius
and imagination have been voluntarily relinquished; and all that
now remains is the copyright of her book, the exclusive right to
Print, reprint and vend it; and those only can be called infringers
of her rights, or pirates of her property, who are guilty of printing,
publishing, importing or vending without her license "copies of her
hook." In tropical, but not very precise phraseology, a translation
may be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or conceptions,
but in no correct sense can it be called a copy of her book.
The plaintiffs' bill is therefore dismissed with costs.
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In the Supreme Court of Vermont.
ABIJAR HURD VS. THE RUTLAND -AND BURLINGTON RAILROAD
COMPANY."
1. Interest of Rail Road Corporation in land. Obligation of land owners and Rail
Road Corporations to fence. Liability for omission to fence. Farm Crossings.
Non-performance of agreement to erect gates.
2. The land, which is taken under the right of eminent domain which exists in this
State, for the use of a rail road, becomes so far the property of the rail road coruse and possession" during the eis:
poration, that their right is exclusive in its
tence of the easement; and those from whom the land is taken, retain no right to
its use, or occupation, for pasturage or otherwise.
3. At common 1aw the owner of a close was not obliged to fence against the cattle
of the occupant of an adjoining close. The statute, imposing the duty on adjoining proprietors of land to erect and maintain fences, recognized the same
principle; for the object and design of fencing is not to keep the cattl& of others
off the premises, but to keep at home the cattle of the occupant This principle
has equal alplication to the owners of land adjoining public highways; and where
no statutes exist, and no obligation is imposed by covenant.or prescription, a Rail
Road Company is not bound to fence their land.
4. Under the provisions of section fourteen of the Act of incorporating the Rutland
and Burlington Rail Road Company, requiring them "1t build and maintain a
sufcient fence upon each side of their road through the whole route thereof," if
the cattle of the owners of adjacent land are found upon the road, and are injured,
through the negligence of the corporation to make and maintain a sufficient.fence,
the corporation are chargeable with the risk, and are subject to such damages as
may be sustained thereby..
5. And where a farm crossing is constructed over the rail road for the benefit of an
adjacent land owner, it is the duty of the corporation, under that statute, to guard
it by a continuous fence, and to erect suitable bars, or gates, in order to give convenient access to it; and if injury arise through the want of such bars or gates,
the corporation will be liable, unless some facts exist, by which they are relieved
from the responsibility.
6. If the land owner refuse to have bars placed at such crossing, and forbid thecorporation to make them, when they offered to do so, or were in the act of erecting
them, this, as against such land owner, would operate as a legal excuse for their
omission to build the fence, even if an express agreement had been made by the
parties for the erection of gates, instead of bars. - For the non-performance of the
agreement,.and the refusal to erect gates, as stipulated, the remedy of the party
would be only by action on the contract for damages. And the effect of the refusal
to have bars erected -ould be to replace upon the land owner the obligation
which vested upon him at common law, to keep his cattle on his own premises,
and from the premises and railway of the corporation.
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for injury to the plaintiff's cattle. Plea, the general
issue, and trial by jury.
On trial it appeared that the defendant's rail road -was constructed
through the pasture lands of the plaintiff, under an award and appraisal of damages by commissioners duly appointed by the
County Court; that by the award, it was provided that the plaintiff
should have furnished for him, by the .defendants, two passes or
farm crossways over the railway, and one pass under the railway;
that subsequently, by agreement between the parties, the plaintiff
gave up one of the over crossings; that the defendants entered upon
the lands so awarded to them and constructed their road, and, in
pursuance of their agreement furnished to the plaintiff one crossing
over their rail road, besides the under pass, and protected iton each
side by-& suitable and sufficient cattle guard, and also made fences of
proper weight and strength on each side of the road, through the
plaintiff's farm, but constructed no gates or bars, at the entrance of
the crossing.
The plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove that by the agreement the defendants were to provide rail road gates, so called, at
the crossing, instead of the bars usually furnished by them in such
cases ; that the defendants did not furnish gates in pursuance of the
agreement, nor erect any bars at the crossing, and in consequence
thereof, about the twenty-fifth of August, 1850, an ox of the plaintiff
was upon the crossing and upon the track of the defendants' road,
and was so injured by a locomotive engine and cars, which were
running on the track, that it was rendered of no use to the plaintiff,
and that afterwards, on the thirty-first of May, 1851, a cow of
the plaintiff was upon the same crossing and was killed in like
manner.
The defendants gave evidence tending to prove that by the agreement with the plaintiff, the plaintiff was to have a free and open
pass over the road at said crossing, at all times, and at his own risk;
that before the injury to the ox, the agents of the defendants, while
putting in bars at said crossing, were expressly forbidden by the
plaintiff to do so, he insisting that he was to have a free and open
pass ; and that subsequently, after the ox was injured and before
TRESPASS

234

HURD vs. RUTLAND AND BURLINGTON R. R. Co.

the cow was killed, the plaintiff, on application to the defendants to
put in gates, refused to allow bars to be put in at the crossing,
claiming at that time, that he was entitled to gates. No evidence
was given of any negligence or wilfulness, on the part of the persons
running the engines at either time.
The defendants insisted that if the plaintiff had any remedy
against them, the suit should have been in case, and not in trespass.
But the Court overruled the objection.
The defendants requested the Court to charge the jury that, if
they found from the evidence, that the cattle, at the time of the
several injuries complained of, were not in charge of any person,
but were at large upon the premises of the defendants and were
there killed without any negligence or wilfulness on the part of
the defendants, or their agents, no recovery could be had'in this
action. But the Courtdeclined so to charge the jury, but did, in
substance charge them, that, if the defendants constructed the far
crossing as an open pass in the plaintiff's pasture, for the purpose
of permitting the cattle of the plaintiff, when in the pasture, to cross
the rail road at their will, and so constructed and left open the pass
at the request of the plaintiff, the cattle .crossed and were upon therail road at the risk of the plaintiff, and the defendants were not
liable for the injury complained of, as there was no evidence that it
was wilfully or negligently done; but that, if the defendants so constructed and left open the pass without the consent or agreement of
the plaintiff, and for the purpose aforesaid, then the cattle would be
upon the rail road at the risk of the defendants, and the plaintiff
would be entitled to receive such damages as le had sustained in
consequence of the injuries of which he complained.
Verdict for plaintiff. Exceptions by defendants.
J. A. Beckwit 7, for de-fendants.
.A. Wooster, for plaintiff.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
IsHAM, .- As no exceptions were taken to the admission of the
testimony under the general issue, no questions now arise as to its
admissibility under that plea.
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.The declaration is in trespass and contains two counts, in th6
first of which it is alleged, that the injury arose by the act of the
defendants' servants, in running their locomotive engine against an
ox of the plaintiff, whereby the animal was injured and rendered of
no value; and in the iecond count the plaintiff complains that the
defendants drove their engine against a cow belonging to the plaintiff, whereby the animal was killed. For these several injuries,
occurring at different times, this action is brought. That the cattle
were injured, and in fact destroyed by an engine of the defendants,
while under the management and direction of their agents and
servants, is not disputed. But whether the injury arose under
circumstances, which render the defendants liable in this action, is
the general question involved in the case.
This rail road was constructed over the farm of the plaintiff,
under an assessment of damages by commissioners; and no objec- tions have been taken, or urged, against the correctness of the
proceeding, by which the land was thus appropriated :-nor has
the title and right of the defendants to the exclusive use and possession of the premises been denied. The land was taken tnder
the right of eminent domain, which exists in the State, in the
exercise of Which the State directs not only the quantity- of land to
be taken, but the extent of that interest which is required to answer
the public purposes for which it is appropriated. 2 Smith's Lead.
Cas. 190. Hfeywood vs. Cit' of New York, 5 Law Reg. 404.
If that interest be regarded as a mere servitude, or easement,
the land nevertheless becomes so far the property of the corporation,
that their right is exclusive in its use and possession during iis
existence,-as much so, as that of the owner, or occupant, of the
adjoining land. Those from whom the land was takefi, retain no
right to its use, or occupation, for pasturage, or .otherwise. The
object for which it is appropriated and used, is wholly inconsistent
with such right on the part of the former owner, as well as with
that security to themselves and safety to the public, which is necessary to enabl6 the corporation to enjoy the franchises granted by
their charter.
In the construction of this road, and under the final arrangement
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of the parties, the defendants were to make, for the plaintiff's use,
two farm crossings,-one over and the other under the railway,
both of which were made, agreeably to that arrangement; and the
over-crossing was protected by suitable cattle guards. We learn
also from the case, that fences on both sides of the road were
erected, of lawful heighth and strength, except at the entrance of
this over-crossing. The cattle of the plaintiff were pastured in the
adjoining field and passed through over the entrances, at this overcrossing, to the track of the road where the injuries were sustained.
In relation to the general liability of the defendants it is proper also
to observe, that no evidence was introduced of any negligence or
wilfulness, on the part of those having charge of the engine, at the
time the injuries were committed. We are therefore to assume,
that on those different occasions the engine was conducted with
proper caution, and that the injuries could not have been avoided
by the exercise of reasonable prudence and care.
.The main question in the case, therefore, is. resolved into the
inquiry, whether a liability in this action is imposed on the defendants by their neglect or refusal to erect a suitable fence by this
over-crossing, so as to prevent the plaintiff's cattle from passing
from the adjoining feld to, and upon the track of this road. For
if the cattle escaped or were found upon this railway, through a
want or defect of fences, which the defendants should have erected
and maintained, ihe injuries sustained would be a consequent of
that wrong, and the defendants, in some way, would be risponsible
for the damages sustained.
At common law the owner of a close wasnot obliged to fence
against the cattle or animals of the occupant of an adjoining close:
"For every man's land is, in the eye of the law, inclosed anid set
apart from another's, either by a visible and material fence, or by
an ideal, invisible boundary, existing only in contemplation of
law; and in either case every entry or breach of a man's close
carries along with it some damage, for which compensation can be
obtained by action." 3 Bl. Com. 209. WVells vs. ilowell, 19
Johns. 385. The owners of adjoining lands were bound to keep
their cattle on their own premises, and prevent them from wander-
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ing on the land of others. The statute imposing the duty on adjoining proprietors of land to erect and maintain fences, recognised
the same principle. For the object and design of fencing is not to
keep the cattle of others off their premises, but to keep their own
'at home. The owner of a close is not required to guard against
the intrusion of cattle, or animals, belonging to others, but each is
required to prevent his own animals from entering upon the close
of the other. Rust vs. Low, 6 Mass. 94. Gale & What. on Easements, 297; Clark vs. Adams, 18 Vt. 425; Knight vs. Abert, 8
Barr. 472. 8 Kent, 535. This principle, derived not only from
the common law, but from the general statutes prescribing the duty
of erecting fences, has equal application to the owners of land adjoining public highways; 1 Cow. 88, (n;) 2 Smith's Lead. .Oas. 184,
(notes;) and applies with still greater propriety and force to land
taken and used for railway purposes. Where no statutes exist, and
no obligation is imposed by covenant, or prescription, a rail road
company is not bound to fence their land; for it has been justly
observed, TFandergrift vs. Redeker, 2 Am. Law Journ. 116; 1
Law Reg. 104, note, "That the owners of adjoining lands and
strangers are bound to keep all cattle ofl the railway traqk, as
much as they are bound to keep them off each other's farms; and
should they fail to do so, they must respond in actions for all consequential damage."
These principles hiave been so often and directly determined in
this country, in relation to railways, that we are not at liberty to
consider them of doubtful existence, or application. They were
adopted in Maine, where no obligation is imposed by charter on a
rail road corporation to erect and maintain fences along the line of
their road. Morse v. B. &' 1. Rail Road Co., 2 Cush. 534; Perkilns v. _aston Rail Road Co., 29 Maine, 807; so in New York,
in the cases of Tonawanda R. B. Go. v. .Munger, 5 Denio 258,
and Clark v. Syracuse R. R. Co., 11 Barb. 277, 4 Corost. 857;
and in Pennsylvania, in the case of -ew York & Brie B. B. Co.
v. &S.inner,
1 Law Reg. 97. 7 Harris Rep. 298, S. C.
If this case were to depend upon principles of common law, it is
evident that no action could be sustained for the injuries complained
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of in this declaration ;-for the plaintiff would. have been in fault,
in permitting his cattle to wander from his own premises on the
track of this road. The cattle would have been wrongfully there,
and all accidents would have been at the risk of the owner. The
defendants would not have been liable for injuries arising froiii the
plaintiff's neglect, unless the injuries might have been avoided by
the exercise, on their part, of reasonable care and prudence. Bridge
v. Grand Junction B. B. Co., 3 M. & W. 244. .Dinos v. Pettey, 15
Ad..&E., N. S. 280. Trow v. Vt. CentralB. B. Co., 24 Vt. 487.
By section fourteen of the act of incorporation of the defendants,-Acts of 1843, p. 55,-a duty is imposed on them "to build
and maintain a sufficient fence upon each side of their road through
the whole route thereof." This provision of the act imposed a duty,
or an obligation, upon the defendants, which did not exist at common law. The- object. of the enactment was obviously to afford
protection to the adjacent owners of land, and to relieve them, so
&hras a fence of that character will have the effect, from the perpetual and onerous charge of keeping their cattle and animals from
the premises and railway of the defendants, and to cast that duty
upon the corporation. . In other words, the defendants, under the
provisions of that act, are required to build and maintain a fence
for the purpose of keeping the cattle of owners of adjacentland
from the premises and track of the road; and, as a necessary consequence, if the cattle of the owners of adjacent land. are found
upon the road and are injured by the defendants, through their
negligence to make and maintain a sufficient fence, they are chargeable with the risk and are subject to such damages as may be Bustained thereby. The principles of law applicable to such a case
were well considered in the case of Sharrod v. .N. W. Bailway Co.,
4"Wels. Hurlst. & Gord. 584, in which PARE, B., observed, ";That
if the cattle had an excuse for being on the road, as if they had
escaped through defect of fences, which the Compainy should have
kept up, the cattle were not wrong doers, they had a right to be
there, and their damage is a consequent damage from the wrong of
the defendants, in letting their fences be incompleted, or out of repair, and may accordingly be recovered by action."
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It was evidently the duty of the defendants, under that statute,
to guard'that farm crossing by a continuous fence, as much as any
other part of the road,-though a different rule would necessarily
apply to all road crossings; and for the purpose of securing to the
plaintiff the benefit of that farm crossing, as well as to prevent his
cattle from wandering upon the track of the road, the defendants.
should have erected bars or gates, such as would be in conformity
with general usage for such-purposes. And as the injury arose at
that place, and for the want of a suitable fence of that character,
the liability of the defendants would seem to be a natural consequence, unless some other facts exist by which they are relieved
from that responsibility.
If the plaintiff refuses to have bars placed there, and forbid the
defendants to make them, when they offered to do so, or were in
the act of erecting them, we entertain no doubt, that, as against
this plaintiff, it would operate as a legal excuse for their omission
to build the fence. The duty created by the statute, was personal
to this plaintiff and such others as were adjoining land holders;
and each adjoining proprietor, so far as he personally was concerned,
might waive or discharge the defendants from its performance; and
after such waiver, he would be estopped from setting up the want
of a sufficient fence, as a substantive ground of complaint. The
erection of sufficient bars by the defendants, would be a full compliance with their duty under the statute; for it would give the
plaintiff the benefit and use of his farm crossing, as well as prevent
his cattle from passing upon the track of this road. And, from the
authorities, this result would seem to follow, even if an express
agreement had been made by the parties for the erection of gates,
instead of bars. For, by the erection of sufficient bars, the duty
imposed by the act would have been complied with; and for the
non-performance of the agreement and the refusal to erect gates,
as stipulated, the remedy of the party would be only by action on
the contract, for damages.
This was so expressly ruled in the case of Norvel v. Smith, Cro.
Eliz. 709. That was ani action of trespass, to which the defendant
pleaded an exchange of lands, and an agreement that the plaintiff
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should make and maintain the fences between them, and that the
defendant's cattle escaped through a defect of fences. On demurrer, the Court ruled, "that the plea was ill, for his agreement
cannot be a bar to the action, but the defendant is put to his action
on the case upon the promise, if he performs it not. And if the
agreement had been by deed, it had not been a bar, but he only
should have been put to his action of covenant." The same doctrine was recognized in -Bustv. Low, 6 Mass. 94, and in .Kyde v.
Aubuzrn & .Rocheter B. B. Co., 2 Barb. Oh. R. 500. The effect,
therefore, of a refusal to have bars erected, is to replace on the
shoulders of the plaintiff that obligation which rested upon him at
common law, to -keep his cattle on his own premises and from the
premises and railway of the defendants; and if, after that refusal
to have bars erected, the cattle were found on the road, they were
wrong doers,-the plaintiff was in fault, and chargeable with negligence to the same extent and degree, as if no statute had been
passed, imposing the duty of fencing the road upon the defendants.
The application of these principles to the case is not a matter of
great difficulty, or doubt. On -the trial of the case before the jury,
the plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove an agreement to provide gates, instead of bars, at this crossing. We have seen that
this testimony is irrelevant, and would have no effect upon the legal
result of the case, if the fact were true. On the other hand, the
defendants gave evidence tending to prove an agreement that it
was to be a free and open pass, and at the risk of the plaintiff.
And the Court charged the jury, that, if that crossing was left as
an open pass at the request of the plaintiff, the action could not be
sustained; and on this question the whole investigation of the case
was made to depend. - The jury, by their verdict, have found that
no request to have that remain as an open pass was ever made;
and on this issue, so presented to them by the Court, a verdict was
rendered for the plaintiff. And the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of. the fact that the crossing was left open without his consent.
But this is far from disposing of the material question in the case,
or of its real merits. The plaintiff did not consent that it should
remain as an open pass, because he insisted upoin the erection of
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gates, and required the performance of that, which, under the act,
an1d so far as a defence to this action is concerned, the defendants
were under no obligation to perform. If the defendants persisted
in the erection of bars, it was the duty of the plaintiff to submit to
their erection and resort to his action on the contract for the erection of gates, if one were made.
The important question in the case, and which really controls its
final result, arises upon other facts stated in the exceptions, and
upon which the Court was sufficiently requested., but neglected to
charge the jury. -The case finds that, before any of the injuries
complained of were committed, the agents of the defendants, while
engaged in putting in bars at this crossing, were expressly forbidden by the plaintiff so to do ; and, after the injury to the ox was
committed, and *before the cow was killed, the plaintiff again rfused to have bars erected at the crossing; and it does not appear
from the case, that these facts were contradicted by any evidence
,on the part of the plaintiff. To these facts the attention of the
jury should have been directed, and, if found true, the Court should
have instructed them, as a matter of law in the case, that, if the
plaintiff refused to have bars erected, and forbid the defendants to
construct them at that place, the defendants were not chargeable
with that negligence or misconduct that will enable the plaintiff to
sustain his action for damages for these injuries. On the contrary,
the plaintiff was in fault in permitting his cattle to run in that open
and uninclosed field, knowing of their exposure to injuries of this
character. And it is not for him to complain of- these injuries,
when he has forbidden the defendants to do what they, by their
charter, were permitted to do, to protect themselves from their liability for such injuries. To this effect the defendants requested the
Court to charge the jury, and the Court neglected to do so; and
for this neglect we think there was error.
Upon the question as to the form of action we refrain from the
expression of any opinion, as the case, upon the other point must
be remanded.
Judgment reversed and case remanded to the County Court.

GUFFY T. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
GUFFY VS. COMMONWEALTH.
1. The great principle of the trial by jury is, that the Court shall determine the
law and the jury the facts.
2. Even in criminal cases, where the jury have a right to determine both the law
and the fact, they are to do so (with the single exception of an acquittal,) "under
the direction of the Court."
3. The necessity of guarding the liberties of the people against the power of the
government, has established the principle that the Court cannot deprive the defendant in a criminal case of the benefit of a verdict of acguitta.
4. In all other cases, civil and criminal, the supervision of the Court in directing
the admission or rejection of evidence, in giving instructions to the jurors on matters of law, and in setting aside a verdict where it is contrary to law or evidence,
is an essential element in the trial by jury.
5: Where there is nothing in the testimony to show that the prosecutor in a criminal case behaved improperly, the Court may set aside so much of the verdict as
directs him to pay the costs, without disturbing the verdict of acquittal, and such
decision is not the subject of review on writ of error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEwIs, J.-The great principle of the trial by jury is that the
Court shall determine the law and the jury the facts. Even in criminal cases, where ihe jury-have a right to determine the law and the
facts, "they are to do so under the direction of the Court,". and
with a single exception, the Court have an undoubted right to grant
a new trial where the verdict is against evidence or law. The only
exception to the rule is that where a defendent is acquitted in a
criminal case, he shall not be put in jeopardy a second time for the'
same offence. This principle, from the necessity of guarding the
liberties of the people against the power of the government, has
been so applied as to deprive the Court of the power to grant a new
trial in a criminal case where the verdict -is in favor of the defendant. In all other cases the supervision of the Court in directing
the admission or rejection of evidence, in giving instructions to the
jury on matters of law, and in setting aside the vierdict where it is
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contrary to the law or evidence, is an essential element in the
trial by jury. These were the rights which belonged to that mode.
of trial at the time when the Constitution of 1790 was adopted, and
these rights are preserved in the provision in that instrument, that
"the trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." It is no more in the power of the Legislature to
alter the essential nature of this trial than it is to abolish it altogether. It is not only "to remain inviolate," but 1 it is to be as
heretofore." It follows that the act of 8 Dec., 1804, authorizing the.
jury in cases of acquittal to "determine by their verdict whether
the county or the prosecutor, or the defendant or defendants should
pay the costs of prosecution," cannot take away the common law
supervision of the Courts which belongs to the trial by jary. The
determination is. to be made by "their verdict," and the use of that
term shows that the decision was intended by the Legislature to be subject to the rules of law which govern verdicts in general. A
decision of a jury contrary to the direction of the Court, and not
subject to its revision, is not a verdict. The jury have the power to
name the prosecutor; but if they name one against whom there is
not a particle of evidence, one who was not the prosecutor, and who
had no notice whatever of the proceedings, the injustice would be so
monstrous that it seems impossible to doubt in regard to the power
and the duty of the. Court to grant redress. So, if the jury should
name as prosecutor the Justice who issued the warrant, the Constable who executed it, or the District Attorney, who sent up the indictment, and prosecuted it, without any other evidence against them
except proof of the performance of their official duties, the demand
for a prompt and efficient remedy would be equally imperative. No
man can suppose for a moment that the Legislature intended to
place it in the power of the jury to impose severe penalties upon
public officers for the faithful performance of their duties. If a
man, upon full proof of the defendant's guilt of a most dangerous
forgery of civil process, by means of which a judgment was unlawfully
obtained, institates a prosecution, and the only witness acquainted
with the facts dies before the trial, and thereby the criminal escapes,
it would be against law and evidence io order the prosecutor to pay
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the costs. We do not say that these are the facts of the case before
us. It is not our duty to inquire into the facts which induced the
Court to decide that there was "nothing in the testimony to show
that the prosecutor behaved improperly," and for that reason to set
aside the verdict "so far as costs are concerned." It is sufficient
for us to say that the Court had a supervision over so much of
the verdict as related to the costs, nothwithstanding the acquittal.
The preamble to the act of 1804 shows that it was not intended to
authorize the jury to punish innocent prosecutors, acting upon well
founded grounds of belief in preferring charges of a character which
ought to be investigated. It was enacted expressly to prevent "restless and turbulent people" from "harrassing the peaceable part of
the community with trifling, unfounded or malic mo
8-rosecukns."
Where the prosecution is not "trifling," but one of a grave charaotQr; where it is not "unfounded," but founded upon probable
oaus. existing at the time it was commenced, but afterwards fails
by the death of material witnesses, and where there is no evidence
of malice in the prosecution, it is the duty of the Court to set aside
the verdict against the prosecutor for the costs. In sho't this is the
duty of the Court in all cases where "there is nothing in the testimony to show that the prosecutor behaved improperly."
The
Court had a discretionary power over the subject, and it is .clear
that matteis within the discretion of the Court below are not the
subjects of review here.
It is no answer to this argument to say that the defendant wi be
deprived of his rights under the statute, if the action of the Court
below be sustained; for he had no rights vested before sentence pronounced, and he has ample remedy, by action, against the prosecu-.
tor, if the prosecution was without probable cause. Nor is it a
sufficient reason for imposing the costs upon an innocent person
that the witnesses for the prosecution may be without remedy
for their fees.
If it is "better that ninety-nine. guilty escape,
than that one innocent man should suffer," it is surely better that
each person should contribute the money, trouble and expense which
falls upon him in promoting the justice of the country, than that
all the charges .should be imposed unjustly upon one.
The sup-
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posed hardship might be remedied by a suitable construction*of the
law; but if not, it is no greater than has frequently happened
under the same Statute before. 4 S. & R. 541; 3 P. R. 865;
1 W. & S.259; 7 W. 485; Bright. Sup. 1849, 188. These hard,ships cannot outweigh ihe principles of public policy which require
that prosecutions founded upon probable cause, for offences which
endanger the rights of the people, ought not to be discouraged by
intimidating officers or citizens, nor can they weigh a feather in opposition to the maxim, -Fiat justitia ruat co~lum."
It is thought by some that the decision of the jury ought to be
conclusive, right or wrong, whether made upon sufficient evidence
and due notice, or without either, upon the ground that their decision
is as likely to be correct as that to be pronounced by the Court.
We have no disposition to claim for the Court what does not properly belong to it, or to disparage the great merits of the jury.
But it is surely not unreasonable to suppose that those who have
devoted their lives to the study and the practice of the law, and
who have been selected by the sovereign authority of the nation,
for their wisdom, integrity and experience, are less liable to err
than men drawn by lot, without especial reference to their qualifications, who may be, and generally are, unacquainted with the
law, and whose necessary attention to other avocations prevents them
from gaining any great experience in the business of administering
justice. It would be as reasonable to expect judges to be good
farmers, mechanics or physicians, as to expect persons of these
pursuits to be learned and experienced jurists. The argument
which excludes the supervision of the Court in this case, would exclude it in all others. But the question is not an open one. It has
been settled by the common law and by the Constitution. So that if
we even concede to the jury a higher degree of integrity as men, and
superior learning and experience as jurists, this does not authorize
the Courts to change the established rules of law, or to disregard
the constitutional duties imposed upon them. While we should be
careful to avoid the usurpation .of powers not conferred, nothing
can justify us in refusing to discharge the duties of a trust indisputably reposed by the people for their own protection.
Judgment affirmed.
KNox, J., dissented.

-

R. L. CURRY vs. J. G, HOFFMAN, B. SAGE, ET AL.

District aourt for the MJty and County of PhiladeZphia.
ROBERT L. CURRY VS. J. G. HOFFMAN, B. SAGE, ET AL.

1. To a plea of justification in trespass qu. cl. fr., &c., that the acts complained of
were rightfully done by the defendants, under an authority vested in them as tax
collectors, to enter and distrain for taxes due them in thst capacity, the plaintiff
replied, protesting that the defendants were not collectors, and that no tax was
due, sic ikjuria, as to the redue of the plea. Heldgood.
2. How far de ikjjuria may be replied generally to a justification under authority in
law, not derived from a Court of record, quare.

This was an action of trespass qu. l. fr., and de bonis asportatio.
The declaration set forth in substance-That on the 25th of
April, 1851, defendants with force, &c., broke into a certain close
of plaintiff,. situate in the
of West Philadelphia, in the
county aforesaid, and took divers goods, viz: 5 horses, 5 carts, 5
screens, and 5 sets of harness of plaintiff's, then being in said close
of said plaintiff, of the value of $500, and carried away the same,
and converted, &c., to their own use, and other wrongs, &c.
The defendants pleaded-1. Not guilty; 2d. Amended plba of
Justification
That before and during the Year 1850 and at the time when,.&c.,
the plaintiff was possessed of a certain close, &c., in d Ward of the
District (then Borough) of West Philadelphia, &c.; that the said
lot and improvements were duly valued and assessed, according to
law, at $1800, and the taxes assessed thereon as follows, (stating
the amount of the State, County, Borough and. Poor taxes, respectivly, on the close and on plaintiff personally); that Hoffman was
duly appointed collector of the Borough and Poor taxes for 1st and
3d Wards, and Sage of the State and Cointy taxes for saidBoro{gh
for 1850. That on the 1st February, 1851, a sum of money, viz.
$27, the amount of said taxes for 1850, was due by plaintiff and
unpaid, and was payable to said Hoffman7 and Sage respectively, as
collectors, &c.; that then and there and at divers other times, said
sum was duly demanded of plaintiff by and on behalf of said Hoffman and Sage as collectors, &c., but plaintiff neglected and refused,
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and bath ever since neglected and refused to make payment of said
amount so due by him. Wherefore the defendants, Hoffman and
Sage, in their rights as collectors of taxes, &c., and by virtue of the
Act of Assembly, &c., and the said Miller as their bailiff, and by
their command, on the 25th April, 1851, viz. 80 days from the
time of demand so made, did enter into and upon said lot and improvements, in order to levy said amount of taxes by distress, and
did then and there seize, levy and distrain on one horse, one cart, one
set of cart harness and three screens, and 'no other articles, goods
or chattels, and sold said horse, cart and harness by public sale,
after giving 10 days public notice of sale by written and printea
advertisements, for the sum of $32.38j; and immediately after said
sale returned said three screens to plaintiff; that the proceeds of
said sale were applied by said Hoffman and Sage to the payment of
said amount of tax so due by plaintiff, and to the expenses of levying on and selllng'the articles aforesaid, which is the same supposed
trespass, &c.
The plaintiff replied to the second plea, protesting thatsaid Hoffman was not duly appointed collector, &c., and that said Sage was
not so appointed collector, &c., and that before, &c., plaintiff .was not
posse.ssed of a close in, &c., valued at $1800, and that the taxes
thereon assessed were not as follows, viz: (as in plea,); and
that defendants of their own wrong, and without the residue
of the cause in their said amended plea mentioned, committed the
said trespass, &c.
To this replication, the defendants demurred, and assigned the
following causes of demurrer, to wit:
1. That although the defendants in their amended plea, have justified the committing the supposed trespass, &c., by virtue of their
right as collectors of taxes, &c., to distrain, levy on and sell said
goods for the payment of taxes, &c., yet the plaintiff instead of
stating his particular answer (if any he has) to said amended plea,
or directly and simply traversing one of the matters stated therein,
or confessing and avoiding such matters, hath by his replication
(after protest .as to divers facts alleged in said amended plea) replied
generally, that defendants of their own wrong, and without the
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residue of the cause in their said amended plea mentioned, committed the said trespass in plaintiffs declaration complained of.
2. That plaintiff, instead of stating his particular answer (if any
he hath) to said amended plea, has replied generally de injuria,8ua
propria.
for Defendants.
Longstreth, for Plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARE, J.-The declaration in this case is in trespass, and the
plea a justification of the acts complained of, on the ground that
they were done rightfully under the authority vested in the defendants as tax collectors, to enter and distrain for money dueto them
in that capacity. The replication protests that the defendants were
not collectors, and that no taxes were due, and then goes on to aver
that they committed the alleged trespass of their own wrong and
without the residue of the cause set forth in the plea. This replication was met by a demurrer, which the defendants sought to sustain at the argument, on the ground that the replication .put various
matters in issue, instead of being confined to a traverse, or confession and avoidance of a single point; and was moreover inadmissible
in answer to a plea which was a justification, and not an excuse.
The latter objection is not stated as a cause of demurrer in- the
pleadings, but we are willing to express our opinion upon it, as well
as the former.
Crogate's Case, (8 Rep. 66,) is well known as the leading case on
this point of pleading, and the" resolutions of the court as reported
by Coke, are the premises on which subsequent judges and lawyers
have' founded their conclusions. It is, however, not a little difficult
to reconcile the first resolution in that case with one of the reasons
given in support of the second. For while it is said in'the first
resolution that a justification under the proceedings of a Court, not
of record, may be traversed by a replication de injuriasua propria,
a replication in the same form to a plea justifying under an interest
in, or an easement attached to land is said to be invalid in the
second resolution, because de injuriaought only to be replied when
the plea is matter of excuse and not of interest. If this reason be
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taken in its more general sense, it necessarily applies to a defence
based on the proceedings of any competent tribunal, whether of
record or not, for he who shows that he has acted under the authority
of the law, shows the fullest and highest legal justification, whatever
may have been the chajinel through which the authority is derived.
It has accordingly been held in a number of cases in New York and
elsewhere, that the plaintiff cannot answer a justification under the
process or decree of a superior or inferior Court, by alleging that
the act complained of was done by the defendant of his own wrong
without the cause alleged in the plea. In Lytle vs. Lee, (15 Johnson, 112,) where this ground was first taken, the justification was
under the judgemeni of a Court of record, and therefore, immediately within the first resolution in (rogate's case, but 0. J. Kent
preferred to rest his own opinion on the general principle that such
a replication is only admissible where the defence is matter of
excuse, and not of absolute right. The rule, said he, "as laid down
in Crogate's case, (8 Co. 66,) and which has since been repeatedly
recognized, (Cooper vs. Monlee, Willis' Rep. 54; Jones vs. Kitchen,
1 Bos. & Pull. 76,) is, that the general replication de nfuria sua
propriaabsque tali causa, is bad, when the defendant insists on a
right, and is good only, when he pleads matter of excuse." Similar views were expressed in Plumb vs. Mcrea, (12 Johnson, 491,)
and Gfriswold vs. Sedgwick, (1 Wend. 126;) but as the justification
in these cases was also under the process of a Court of record, the
right to reply de injuria to plea justifying under the authority of a
Coui't not of record can hardly be said to have been presented in a
shape for decision. But in Goburn vs. Hopkins, (4 Wend. 577,)
where the defendant justified under a warrant from a,justice of the
peace, and was therefore clearly without the first resolution with
regard to matter of record; a replication de injuriawas held demurrable on the ground that the defence was one of right and not
of excuse. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Sutherland, J
held the following language :-" The general replication de infuria
sua propriaab quo tali causa is bad when the defendant justifies
or insists on a right, an'd is good only when he pleads matter of
excuse; (Crogate'scase, 8 Coke 66; Willes 54; 1 Bos. & I'dil. 76:
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Com. Dig. Plead. F. 18 to 20,) and this rulb is not confined to
cases where the plea sets up matter of record as well as matter of
fact, and where the general replication would put in issue to the
jury the matter of record as well as the matter of fact. Oh. J.
Kent, in Lytle vs. Lee & Buggles, (5 Johns. R. 114) does not consider this the .true ground of the rule, but holds such a replication
to be bad wherever the plea insists upon a full and adequate right
or justification. In such a case, the plaintiff is bound to traverse
his right."
Notwithstanding the respect due to the authority of these decisions, their soundness might be questioned, and they certainly go
much beyond many of the cases on which they profess to be based.
The case of Jones vs. Kitcldn, 1 Bos. & Pull. 76, does not sustain
this decision, for as the defendant in that case justified under the
title of a third person, -and an authority derived from him. This
replication was clearly bad under the second and third resolutions
in (rogate's case, as involving matter of authority and title, and
the opinion of the Court went on that ground, and not on the
ground held in New York.
The same remark applies to the case of Cooper vs. IJHonke, (Willis
42,) when the plea justified the taking of the plaintiff's goods and
chattels as a distress for rent, and therefore involved matter of title.
and commandment, which cannot be-traversed by a replication
de injuria. And while there-would seem to be no English case
which decides that the reason given in the second resolution, overthrows or weakens the force of the express words of the first resolution, that "1de injuria"may generally be replied to a justification
by force of any proceeding in the Admiral Court, hundred or
county, or any other -court which is not a court of record, because
all is matter of fact, and all makes but one cause; there are several
which rule the point the other way. Thus in Selby vs. Barden,
(3 B. & Ad. 1,) where the defendant justified under a warrant of
two justices commanding him to distrain the goods of the plaintiff
for non-payment of taxes; the plaintiff was held entitled to reply,
that the defendant had acted of his own wrong and without the
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cause alleged in the plea, and thus put the whole justification in
issue by one traverse.
Were we obliged to reconcile what appears to be a discrepancy
between this case, and those already cited from the New York
reports, we should feel -some difficulty, but we are relieved from
this necessity by the case of &Siokle vs. Bichmond, (1 Hill, -78,)
where the court re-afirm. the doctrine held in Plzumb vs. McCrea,
and Coburn vs. Hopkins, :but decide notwithstanding, that if the
plaintiff admitted that portion of a plea of justification, which consisted in the allegation of an authority in law, he inight go on to
aver, that the defendant did the. act in question of his own wrong,
and without the residue of the cause alleged in the plea. Now
that is precisely what the plaintiff has done here, for of the three
points which make up the defence in the plea, viz: that a tax had
been assessed against the plaintiff that the defendants had authority
and law to collect it, and that the acts complained of in the declaration, were done in pursuance of that authority, the last only is
put at issue, and the others simply met by a protestation. The
replication is therefore good under all the authorities on this pomt;
and it is equally free from the objection of multifariousness, for as
it does not deny that the defendants had the authority which they
allege, but merely disputes the mode in which their authority was
exercised, and all the facts which it puts in issue bear on that single
point cannot be doubted. There is nothing in (rogate's case which
conflicts with this reasoning, for although one of the grounds for
giving judgment for the defendant in Crogate's case, was multifariousness, yet the replication there embraced not only different facts
but different points of a character, too remote and dissimilar to be
properly brought within the scope of one issue, and it plainly
appears from the first resolution, that various matters of fact may
be traversed when they make but one cause.
"I agree," said Eyre, C. J., in Jones vs. Xtchin, "to the rule
laid down in Coeleri7l vs. Armstrong, (Bullers, N. P., 93,) that
where the excuse arises in part out of the seisin in fee of another,
then de inuriasua yropria,is not to be replied. But the reason
is not because it puts two or three things in issue, for that may
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happen in every case where the defense arises out of several facts,
all operating to one point of excuse; the reason is because this
plea is only allowed when an excuse is offered for personal injuries,
and not even if it relates to any interest in hand or to any commandment." The replication de injuria, seems moreover, to 'be
entitled to more latitude than an ordinaty traverse, and to be meant
to bring many different but not divurging iays into one legal focus.
'The different matters put at issue in $elhy vs.
Barden, could
have been denied by a direct traverse witho ut duplicity. And in
Griffin vs. Yates, 2 B. N. C., 879, where the court overruled a
traverse in the ordinary form on the ground bf duplicity, they held
that the same matters might be put at issue without objection, by
replying de injuria.
However this may be, it is enough ,to say without speculating
further on the questions on which the cases differ, that they all
concur, as to the point on which we base this decision.
The defendants may withdraw their demurrer and plead issuably
within eight days; otherwise
Judgment for plaintiff.'

IThe later English cases warrant the use of the replication de ijuria, though the
plea sets up a justification under an "authority given by the law," unless it be at
the same time derived mediateiy or immediately from the plaintiff, .or bb the
process of a court of record. Barden vs. Selby, 9 Bingh. 756, (in error;) Bowler
vs. Nicholson, 12 Ad. & Ellis, 341; Edmunds vs. Penniger, 7 Q. B. 558; Mortimer vs.
Moore, 8 Q. B. 294; Price vs. Woodhouse,. 16 M. & W. 1; See, however, Worsley
vs. The South Devon Rail Road Company, 4 Eng. L. & Eq., 230. And the exception
with regard to "matter of interest" in the defendant, applies only where that
interest existed anterior to, and independently of the act of trespass complained of,
and was not created thereby. Barden vs. Selby, ut supr. The distinction indeed
between a plea in justification, and a plea in excuse, as such, appears -entirely
unfounded. See Salter vs. Purchell, 1 Q. B. 220.-Et*.

WILLIAM CASE vs. ISAAC H. CASE.

In the Court of Common Pleas, of .Erie County, Pennsylvania.
WILLIAM CASE vs. ISAAC H. CASE.

1. Where several Foreign Attachments are executed the same day and upon the
same prerty,but at different hours of the day, the money made from the sale of
the property should be applied to the payment of the judgments obtained upon
them in the order of their service. -The first executed should be firstpaid.
2. Where several Foreign Attachments are simultaneously executed upon the same
property, the judgments obtained upon them should be paid pro rata.
3. Where several Foreign Attachment9 are executed the same day and upon the
same property, and each of the writs shows the same return, the sheriff who made
the service is a competent witness for the purpose of proving that they were exEecuted at different hours of the day.

Isaac H. Case, a non-resident debtor, had personal property to
a considerable amount in the County of Erie. On the 20th September, 1850, a fi. fa. was issued upon a judgment entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, upon a bond with warrant
of Attorney against the said Jacob H. Case, in favor of William
Case, and placed in the hands of the sheriff, who the same day
levied on the personal property of the defendant. On*the same
day a writ of Foreign Attachment was issued at the suit of J. Hearn
& Co., against the same defendant, upon which the same property
was attached, subject to the previous fI. fa. On the 23d day of
September, 1850, five writs of Foreign Attachment were issued out
of the same court against said Case, at the suits of Swift & Shaw,
Knapp & Brother, Charles Metcalf, Yelvertons & Fellows, and
Freeman Patterson, all of which Attachments the sheriff served on
the same day, by attaching the same property levied on by said f1.
fa. subject to said levy, and made the same return to each of the
five writs. The sheriff sold the property on said fI. fa. for the sum
of $2,153 00, and brought the money into Court for distribution.
Judgments at the proper time were recovered on each of the said
Attachments. -The matter of distribution was referred to Matthew
Taylor, Esq., Auditor. -On the distribution before the auditor, P.
E. Burton, Esq., the sheriff who executed the Attachment -was
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sworn, and testified that the Attachments of Swift & Shaw, Knapp
& Brothers, and Charles Metcalf were served at the same time, to
wit, in the fore-noon of September 23d, 1850. The Attachment of
Freeman Patterson was served in the afternoon. Subsequently,
during the same afternoon or evening, the Attachment of Yelvertons
& Fellows was served. The Auditor appropriated enough of the
money to pay the fl. fa. and J. ]earn & Co.'s attachment in full,
and the balance $720 he distributed pro rata,among the five attachments which were issued, served, and returned the same day, without regard to the different hours of the day on which they were
executed. To which report three of the attaching creditors, to wit,
Swift & Shaw, Charles Metcalf, and Freeman Patterson excepted,
because the Auditor erred in paying the various judgments that
were obtained on the foreign attachments pro rata,when the services
of the same were made at different periods of the day; alleging
that the payments should have been made pro tanto, in the order in
which the services were made, as shewn by the testimony of P. E.
Burton.
Thompson and Grant for exceptants cited -the 50th Sect. of
the Act of 13th June, 1836; Dunlop's Dig. 742; Htzler vs.
Kilgore, 3d P. R. 245; Mechanics' Bank vs. Gorman, 8 W. &
S. 804. Watson on Sheriff, 72; Coulter & Go. vs. Lowry/, 9 Barr,
349; Flick vs. Troxsell, 7 W. & S. 65.
Marshall and Vincent, contra. 1 Ld. Ray, 281, 20th Viner's
Abt. tit. time, 286; 2 Roll. Abt. 520; Metzler vs. Kilgore, 3 P.
R. 245; Netz. vs. Hammon, 5 Wh. 150; Flick vs. Troxsell, 7
W. & S. 65; Dillon vs. _oberts, 13 S. & R. 60; Blythe vs.
Richards, 10 S. & R. 261; -Paxtonvs. Sleckel, 2 Barr, 93.
The Court filed the following opinion.
CHuRcH, P. J. Two ivrits of foreign attachment by different
creditors were issued and executed upon the same property, on the
same day, the one in the morning, the other in the evening, and
several hours after the former. The question is, has the former
priority of lien?
A glance at general principles and adjudication's upon analogous
cases suffices to answer the question in the affirmative. By the
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execution of the writ the property is in the custody of the law, and
the officer becomes the special owner. The defendant retains the
general ownership, but he cannot divest the other directly or indirectly, but by payment of the claim and costs. He cannot do it
by permitting process to issue against him for the recovery of his
indebtedness. The fiction in relation to computation of time is
inapplicable. The rule that there is no fraction of a day is true
only sub mode, and in a very limited sense, and when it promotes
right and justice, and never allowed against, it -when connected with
matters in yais, which are the individual acts of the parties, to ascertain who has priority of lien, as when goods are attached the same
day with an act of bankruptcy. SeeIn re Ric)hardson, 6 L. R. 392, U.
S. C. C., per Story, J. ; also In re Welman, 7 L. R. 25,. U. S. D.
C., Vermont, per Prentiss, J. The language of the Act of Assembly
is, that the property shall be bound from and after the service of
the writ, and is directed to remain to answer and abide the judgment
of the Court in that case. The act of service creates the lien, like
the levy by an execution issued from a justice of the peace, under
the act of 1810. It was not until the act of 1836, relative to executions that the sheriff was required to note the hour of the day a
ft. fa. came to his hands, yet priority of lien before that, was regulated in the same way as since, but from another character of evidence.
The latter act created no lien, but only pointed out another way
of ascertaining the priority of the one already existing.
Prior to the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, of Charles II. the
lien of a ft. fa. related back to the teste day of the writ. That
statute and our own act of assembly of 1772, limit this lien to the
time the writ was delivered to the officer, and for the better manifestation of the time, he was directed to indorse the day of the month
and year lie received it. It will be observed that time is the word
used in these laws. The same used in the execution act of assembly
of 1836, and in the foregoing attachment law of the same year.
In 1797 the.Supreme Court held that even leaving a ft. fa. at
the slieriff's office would'give priority from such time against another
of the same day, but afterwards. Mifthin vs. Will, 2 Yeats, 177.

